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In a Fortnight:  
Manila’s Pivot Toward  
Beijing 
 
In mid-October, Philippine President Rodrigo 
Duterte visited China. His visit was marked by a re-
calibration in Philippine policy toward China and the 
announcement of economic and military “separa-
tion” from the United States.  
 
The reversal in relations is striking. Under the previ-
ous Aquino administration, the Philippines had acted 
as the primary and most direct challenger to Chinese 
claims in the South China Sea, bringing a case 
against the PRC in the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion (PCA). After the PCA ruled against Chinese ter-
ritorial claims, Chinese officials and scholars were 
incensed. One article by China International Studies 
Institute scholar Jia Xiudong (贾秀东) advised the 
Philippines to “give up its fantasy as soon as possi-
ble…China will not sit idly by” (CIIS.org, July 22). 
President Aquino expanded military cooperation 
with the United States, and he began an ambitious 
modernization plan for the Philippine Armed Forces 
(PAF). Other nations in ASEAN, also feeling threat-
ened by the extent of Chinese claims, began to take 
harder stances. Indonesia, long irritated by Chinese 
fishing boats’ activity in the Natuna Shoals, blew up 
over a hundred captured Chinese fishing vessels and 
began rearming nearby islands (China Brief, March 
25).  
 
Duterte’s election in May put the Philippines on an 
entirely different course. Bombastic rhetoric aside, 
President Duterte’s recalibration toward China has 
its roots in the Philippines economic situation. An 
unabashedly domestically focused president, Duterte 
has taken up crime and economics as his main issues. 
Though his calls for killing drug dealers has largely 
alienated his administration, China expressed sup-
port for the Philippines efforts to deal with its drugs 
problem, something with which China itself is also 
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struggling (See China Brief, March 24). An exami-
nation of economic fundamentals and China and the 
U.S.’s respective foreign policy provides useful con-
text for understanding Duterte’s shift.  
 
The Philippines trails its neighbors in terms of a num-
ber of important economic indicators and moving 
Filipinos out of poverty will require additional for-
eign investment and a better business climate. 
Duterte has announced a new development plan for 
the Philippines entitled “AMBISYON NATIN 2040” 
whose plans for “a prosperous, predominantly mid-
dle-class society where no one is poor” by 2040 at 
least rhyme with China’s plans to build a “moder-
ately prosperous society” (小康社会) (neda.gov.ph, 
October 14; Seeking Truth, April 30, 2015). 
Duterte’s trip to Beijing yielded promises of $24 bil-
lion worth of loans and infrastructure projects (ABS-
CBN, October 21). China’s lifting of restrictions on 
Philippine exports could further raise this number. 
 
China is already the Philippines largest trade partner. 
In 2014, the Philippines exported $19 billion dollars-
worth of computers and commodities to China, ac-
counting for 24 percent of its total exports. In 2015 
bilateral trade between the two countries amounted 
to $45.6 billion (MOFCOM, February 5). By con-
trast, total U.S.-Philippines trade was $18 billion for 
that year (Census.gov, [accessed November 9]). The 
combination of existing economic influence, 
Duterte’s domestic focus and Beijing’s eagerness to 
both expand foreign markets and achieve policy 
goals created the environment for the Philippines to 
realign itself.  
Strategically both the Philippines and China have 
much at stake. The Philippines’ turn inward appears 
to be mirrored in Duterte’s priorities for the Philip-
pines Armed Forces. On October 10, Duterte issued 
an executive order reorganizing the cabinet structure 
and increasing the PAF’s role domestically by mak-
ing the Secretary of National Defense the Chair of the 
“Security, Justice and Peace Cluster” (gov.ph, Octo-
ber 14). Such a focus on improving domestic stability 
rather than confronting China might have to do with 
Duterte’s conception of the balance between the two 
states. Even with an influx of jet aircraft and new 
ships from Korea, Japan and the United States in re-
cent years, the Philippine Armed Forces are inade-
quately equipped to even consistently patrol the dis-
puted areas. Former Department of Foreign Affairs 
Albert del Rosario sought “clarification” of whether 
the U.S. considered its Mutual Defense Treaty ex-
tended to protecting these areas—without result. For 
Duterte’s administration, making a deal that would 
allow  access to Scarborough Shoal and other parts 
of the South China Sea without a confrontation with 
China is not an empty gesture for Filipinos. More 
than 1 million Filipinos fish for a living and these ar-
eas are the site of intense competition (FAO.org, Ac-
cessed November 9). For its part, after Duterte’s trip 
China has made it clear that granting access to the 
area in no way diminishes its sovereignty over the 
area and “the situation has not changed” (FMPRC, 
October 31).  
 
Strategically, any lever to strain U.S.-Philippine re-
lations works to China’s advantage. Historically the 
Philippines have been a stepping-stone for projecting 
U.S. air power on to the Asian mainland—B-17s 
were deployed to Clark Air Field in the months be-
fore Pearl Harbor as a hedge against a restive Japan. 
[1] U.S. P-8 surveillance aircraft flying out of the 
same base kept close tabs on China’s island-building 
campaign. Until its closure in 1991, Subic Naval 
Base was the largest U.S. naval facility in the world, 
and has since continued to host U.S. vessels. Just as 
U.S. presence on Okinawa, elsewhere in Japan and to 
a lesser extent, Guam, makes Chinese leaders un-
comfortable, the ease of access and planned expan-
sion of U.S. basing in the Philippines poses a direct 
threat to Beijing.  
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Malaysia appears to be making a similar move. In 
2015, Xi Jinping met Malaysian Prime Minister 
Najib Razak on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperating (APEC) meeting, emphasizing 
that China considers the bilateral relationship with 
Malaysia “a priority” (Xinhua, November 17, 2015). 
Prime Minister Najib Razak visited Beijing shortly 
after Duterte and landed a number of economic and 
military agreements (SCMP, October 31). Malay-
sia’s total trade in 2015 with China was $59 Billion, 
$46 Billion with the United States (MOFCOM, April 
1; Census.gov, [accessed November 9]). Malaysia 
also hosts regular P-8 flights, and it frequently par-
ticipates in joint U.S. military exercises. If Beijing 
can use economic incentives to decrease U.S. access 
to these areas, it will place real strategic costs on U.S. 
forces operating in the Pacific.  
 
China’s use of economic carrots continues to be ef-
fective from the Baltic to the South China Sea. With 
continuing economic contraction at home, and bad 
bets abroad, such as in Venezuela, the sustainability 
of economic incentives is far from certain. However, 
Xi’s strategy in buying China diplomatic breathing 
room has paid off. Though the outgoing U.S. admin-
istration made some moves to gain influence with 
China’s traditional supporters in ASEAN, such as 
Laos, it is clear that China’s large overall economic 
engagement in the region—and targeted diplomatic 
overtures—have won this round for influence in 




1. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, 
Chapter 3, Available here http://www.his-
tory.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_3.htm 
2. Remarks by Air Force Combatant Com-
mander General Herbert Carlisle, CSIS, Mil-
itary Strategy Forum: General Herbert 
“Hawk” Carlisle on Air Combat Command: 







Xi Jinping Uses New  
“Leadership Core” Status to 
Boost His Faction 
 
By Willy Lam 
 
The just-ended Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) Central Committee elevated 
President Xi Jinping to the status of “core of the lead-
ership.” However, few concrete measures to fight 
corruption, were announced at the four-day conclave. 
This is despite the fact that the leitmotif of the Sixth 
Plenum was to revise regulations on “norms of polit-
ical life” as well as “intra-Party supervision.” Even 
though the official media has noted that fighting graft 
will be facilitated by a top leader with overriding au-
thority, tough measures obliging senior cadres to dis-
close their assets and those of their close kin failed to 
be passed by the 370-member Central Committee. 
And while the plenum communiqué stressed “intra-
Party democracy,” Xi’s continuing consolidation of 
power calls into question institutional reforms that 
were made by late patriarch Deng Xiaoping.  
 
The Sixth Plenum communiqué released on October 
27 emphasized that all CCP members must “closely 
unite around the CCP Central Committee with Xi 
Jinping as the core” (Xinhua, October 28; China 
Daily, October 27). Xi is not the only leader to have 
attained “core” status. Jiang Zemin, who was CCP 
general secretary from 1989 to 2002, was referred to 
as the “core of the third-generation leadership.” 
However, when fourth-generation leaders Hu Jintao 
and Wen Jiabao came to power, Jiang’s “core” status 
faded into irrelevance. However, Xi is simply “core 
of the leadership”—there is no qualification that he 
is “core of the fifth-generation leadership.” His 
“core” status therefore transcends term limits, tenure 
or retirement age (BBC Chinese, October 28; Radio 
Free Asia, October 28). By securing the “leadership 
core” designation Xi has confirmed widespread spec-
ulation he may rule for at least three terms, that is, 
until the 21st Party Congress in 2027 (See China 
Brief, March 7).  
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Xi and his close associates, including Li Zhanshu (栗
战书), Director of the CCP General Office have been 
scheming for the investiture of the “core” title since 
2014. In a September 2014 article on the need for ca-
dres to profess “absolute loyalty” to the top leader-
ship, Li wrote that “any leadership collective must 
have a core; a leadership without a core [figure] is 
untenable” (People’s Daily Online, September 29, 
2014). Last January, a dozen-odd regional officials 
became the first to hail Xi as “the core of the CCP 
leadership” (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], February 3; 
Phoenix TV, January 31). But this apparently elicited 
opposition from politicians not associated with the 
inchoate Xi Jinping faction. During the meeting of 
the National People’s Congress and the Chinese Peo-
ple’s Political Consultative Conference in March, 
none of the dozens of top cadres who gathered in the 
capital used this elevated designation for Xi. How-
ever, Li, who has a very high chance of being pro-
moted to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) 
next year, revived the “core” issue in a series of 
speeches last August (Radio French International 
Chinese Service, August 12; Sing Tao Daily News 
[Hong Kong], August 11).  
 
Xi already has personal control over areas ranging 
from foreign and military policies to Party affairs and 
economy and finance. This is due to his leadership of 
up to ten top-level decision-making bodies directly 
under the PBSC, including the Central Military Com-
mission, the Central National Security Commission, 
the Central Leading Group on Finance and Econom-
ics and the Central Leading Group on Comprehen-
sively Deepening Reform. The intensity of allegiance 
that cadres must profess to the “core” is astounding. 
“In upholding Party leadership, we must first of all 
insist upon the concentrated and united leadership of 
the dangzhongyang [党中央, Party central authori-
ties],” the Sixth Plenum communiqué said. It urged 
all Party members to “self-consciously remain in a 
high degree of unison in thought and action with the 
dangzhongyang.” That “core” Xi is the personifica-
tion of the dangzhongyang is clear: the document em-
phasized that “for a country and a political party, the 
leadership core is of utmost importance.” 
 
What will Xi use his new powers for? As Beijing-
based historian Zhang Lifan pointed out, “Xi has won 
a tough battle by finally acquiring the ‘core’ status.” 
Zhang added that this designation of unchallenged 
supremacy would enable the supreme leader to en-
sure that more members of his Xi Jinping Faction—
which is made up principally of associates and un-
derlings of Xi’s when he worked in Fujian and 
Zhejiang Provinces as well as Shanghai—to be pro-
moted to the Central Committee and the Politburo at 
the 19th Party Congress in late 2017 (Apple Daily 
[Hong Kong], October 27; Radio Free Asia, October 
24). In the past six months or so, a dozen-odd Xi pro-
tégés from Zhejiang Province alone have been ele-
vated to posts that will entitle them to membership in 
the Central Committee or even the Politburo. Promi-
nent among them are the just-appointed Mayor of 
Beijing Cai Qi (蔡奇, a former executive vice-gover-
nor of Zhejiang); Party Secretary of Jiangsu Province 
Li Qiang (李强, former Zhejiang governor); Acting 
Governor of Shanxi Province Lou Yangsheng (楼阳
生, former head of the United Front Department of 
the Zhejiang Party Committee), Governor of Shaanxi 
Province Hu Heping (胡和平, former Head of the 
Organization Department of the Zhejiang Party 
Committee) and the Governor of Jiangxi Province 
Liu Qi (刘奇, former Party boss of the Zhejiang city 
of Ningbo) (Ming Pao, October 30; South China 
Morning Post, October 30; Apple Daily, October 24).  
 
At the same time, “core” Xi is expected to move 
more aggressively against so-called conspiratorial 
groups and cliques in the Party which refuse to pro-
fess allegiance to the paramount leader. In a much 
noted speech earlier this year to the Central Commis-
sion on Discipline Inspection, the nation’s highest-
level graft-buster, Xi warned against “careerists and 
conspirators” wreaking havoc on Party discipline and 
threatening Party unity. (Xinhua, May 3; People’s 
Daily, January 14). The communiqué warned against 
liangmianren (两面人 , “two faced people”) who 
were plotting to advance their careers through “ex-
changing flattery and favors.” At a press conference 
one day after the Sixth Plenum, Deputy Director of 
the CCP Organization Department Qi Yu struck the 
same note about “a small minority of senior cadres 
with overweening ambitions and lust for power.” 
These bad apples were accused for “forming cliques 
and factions” so as “to boost their selfish interests 
and to seek high positions.” “They have severely 
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damaged Party unity and [the principle of a] central-
ized and united leadership,” Qi said (People’s Daily, 
August 28; Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong], August 28). 
While the mainland media has never mentioned Xi’s 
turf warfare against two rival CCP cliques—the 
Shanghai Faction led by former President Jiang and 
the Communist Youth League Faction (CYLF) 
headed by former President Hu Jintao—it seems 
clear that the warnings against establishing anti-Xi 
groupings are also made with these two power blocs 
in mind (See China Brief, May 11).  
 
In an apparent effort to pacify cadres and Party mem-
bers who have reservations about Xi becoming the 
equivalent of the “Great Helmsman,” the plenum 
communiqué indicated that the CCP had not departed 
from the idea of a “collective leadership.” New reg-
ulations on Party life and Party discipline—which 
will be released later this month—would be geared 
toward fostering “intra-Party democracy.” “Democ-
racy within the Party is the life of the Party,” the doc-
ument said, adding that Party members should have 
the right to express their views. “No Party organs or 
individuals can infringe upon the democratic rights 
of Party members,” it said.  
 
The “collective leadership” advocated by Xi, how-
ever, is a far cry from that championed by Deng 
Xiaoping in the early 1980s. In order to prevent the 
return of Mao-style dictatorship, Deng indicated that 
China should be run by a leadership collective 
roughly equivalent to the PBSC. Within such a 
framework, the general secretary can be described as 
a first among equals. And should there be seminal 
disagreements among PBSC members over policy, 
votes should be cast, in which case the weight of the 
general secretary’s vote is equal to that of his col-
leagues. Moreover, each PBSC member has a distinct 
portfolio. And unless there is a crisis, the general sec-
retary is not supposed to meddle with how his PBSC 
colleagues handle their portfolios. Particularly after 
acquiring the “core” status, however, Xi towers 
above other PBSC members, who must periodically 
seek his guidance and approval (Liberty Times [Tai-
pei] October 29; Voice of America Chinese, May 16; 
New York Times Chinese Edition, June 2, 2015).  
 
The best example of Xi riding herd over his PBSC 
colleagues is the much-diminished “economic tsar” 
role of the premier of the State Council Li Keqiang, 
who is ranked No. 2 in the CCP’s pecking order. 
From the days of Deng to the 18th Party Congress, 
the premier usually heads the Central Leading Group 
on Finance and Economics—and he has the ultimate 
say over financial, economic and related policies. 
Soon after he took over power in late 2012, however, 
Xi arrogated to himself the leadership of the CLGFE. 
Premier Li, a CYLF stalwart who is former President 
Hu’s confidant, has to seek Xi’s approval for major 
financial and economic decisions (Radio Free Asia, 
June 1; Voice of America Chinese Service, May 11). 
In recent months, there is evidence that Xi is trying 
to marginalize the third-ranked PBSC member, Na-
tional People’s Congress chairman Zhang Dejiang. 
Zhang, who is close to the Shanghai Faction, is in 
charge of the legislature as well as policy over Hong 
Kong. In the past month or so, Sing Pao, a pro-China 
paper in Hong Kong which is close to Xi camp has 
lambasted Zhang’s “devastating failures” in Hong 
Kong policies (Hong Kong Economic Journal, No-
vember 1; Hong Kong Free Press, October 3).  
 
What about new and thorough-going measures to 
promote clean governance and to eradicate corrup-
tion? The Sixth Plenum communiqué stressed the im-
portance of “the Party exercising control over itself 
and Party [leaders] running with Party with severity.” 
Leaders in particular would be subjected to tight 
scrutiny as “all Party members are equal before Party 
discipline and there is no special privilege [for top 
officials] regarding Party discipline.” While the full 
text of the revised regulations on “intra-Party disci-
pline” has not yet been released, it is clear that earlier 
proposals about an “assets-disclosure sunshine regu-
lation” were voted down by the Central Committee. 
This regulation would have obliged Central Commit-
tee members and other senior cadres to disclose their 
assets as well as those of their spouses and children. 
Moreover, top officials must tell the public whether 
their close kin have foreign passports or residence 
permits (Wen Wei Po, October 24; Hong Kong Eco-
nomic Journal, October 13). Instead, the plenum doc-
ument merely emphasized that senior cadres must 
“set themselves up as an example” of clean govern-
ance and that they must pay close attention to the 
business activities of their family members (Xinhua, 
October 29).  
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In the run-up to the Plenum, senior cadres reiterated 
that the Party itself could take care of problems in-
cluding graft and other economic crimes through 
“self-purification, self-improvement, self-renewal 
and raising [the Party’s] own competence.” While 
CCDI chief Wang Qishan referred to the difficulty of 
“a patient performing surgery on himself,” the Party 
leadership has rejected suggestions about giving 
powers to forces outside the Party—including the 
media—to help monitor corruption (Ming Pao, Octo-
ber 23). This is partly due to President Xi’s insistence 
that cadres and Party members must have “self-con-
fidence” in the path, theories, institutions and culture 
of the Party. The Communiqué has reinforced the Xi 
administration’s belief in the Party’s ability to cure 
itself by urging members to pay more attention to 
“culture, morality, honesty and the sense of honor 
and shame.”  
 
Analysts familiar with Beijing’s decades-old anti-
corruption crusade, however, have cast doubt on the 
efficacy of “self-improvement” measures such as 
cultivating high moral standards. Wang Yukai (汪玉
凯), a professor at the National Academy of Admin-
istration and a frequent commentator on the issue of 
clean governance, said that only “tough, undiluted in-
stitutional arrangements” would have a big social im-
pact. Apart from regulation on the disclosure of the 
assets and foreign nationalities of senior cadres and 
their close kin, Wang noted that special privileges ac-
corded top-level national and local officials such as 
housing and other perks “should be standardized and 
rendered public” (Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], Octo-
ber 24). It is beyond doubt that Xi has been more suc-
cessful in tackling graft than his predecessors. His 
no-holds-barred power grab—and the favoritism and 
cliquishness exposed by the fast-track promotion of 
Xi protégés to top positions—could create the kind 
of special privileges that are deemed the hotbed of 
corruption. 
 
Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The 
Jamestown Foundation. He is an Adjunct Professor 
at the Center for China Studies, the History Depart-
ment and the Program of Master’s in Global Politi-
cal Economy at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. He is the author of five books on China, in-
cluding “Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New 
Leaders, New Challenges.” 
Downsizing the PLA, Part 2: 
The Potential for Social  
Instability 
By John Chen  
 
Note that this is Part 2 of a two-part series on the 
PLA’s planned personnel cuts. Part 1 can be found 
here.  
 
Part 1 of this series examined the mechanisms for 
downsizing the PLA by 300,000 personnel, including 
two-year enlistees, noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs), and officers before they meet their manda-
tory retirement age. The article described what bene-
fits each officer and enlisted member is entitled to 
based on their grade and years of service. Part 2 as-
sesses the PLA’s ability to carry out the force reduc-
tion from 2.3 to 2.0 million (about 11 percent of total 
PLA strength) by the end of 2017. Can national level 
or local governments and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) find jobs for all the downsized personnel en-
titled to an equivalent civilian government or SOE 
position? Has the central government allocated 
enough resources to pay legally mandated benefits 
and pensions? Most importantly, will sending a large 
percentage of downsized personnel back to their 
home provinces have a negative impact on social sta-
bility? 
 
Current conditions in China exacerbate the chal-
lenges of executing the force reduction. After dec-
ades of rapid growth, China’s economy is slowing to 
a “new normal” of 6–7 percent growth (The World 
Bank, August 11). The government is embarking on 
“structural reforms” to reduce overcapacity in the 
steel and coal sectors, potentially shedding millions 
of jobs, many in the economically depressed North-
eastern rust belt (Xinhua, July 11). These circum-
stances will complicate efforts to implement the cur-
rent and any future PLA force reductions, and the 
contours of the actual downsizing could aggravate 
tensions between local governments and the PLA. 
However, the troop reduction is unlikely to generate 
a “perfect storm” of social instability that could im-
mediately threaten Communist Party rule.  
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Does China Have Enough Resettlement Capacity? 
 
According to the 2001 Provisional Measures for Re-
settling Transferred Officers [军队转业干部安置暂
行办法] and 2011 revisions to the Enlisted Personnel 
Resettlement Regulations [退役士兵安置条例], dis-
charged NCOs with more than 12 years of service, 
division-leader grade officers with less than 30 years 
of service, and battalion-leader grade officers or 
lower with less than 20 years of service are entitled 
to civilian jobs with equivalent pay and benefits. [1] 
The process of finding jobs for personnel that leave 
the PLA before their mandatory retirement age based 
on their grade is broadly referred to as resettlement 
[安置]. Can local governments and SOEs find posi-
tions for all these personnel? [2] Officer resettlement 
statistics from past years suggest that officer resettle-
ment this year will be difficult but not unprecedented. 
A 2013 Caixin article noted that from 2008 to 2012, 
the number of resettled officers that transferred to ci-
vilian positions in all of China numbered anywhere 
from 39,000–56,000 during years when the PLA was 
not carrying out announced downsizing, and a Bei-
jing Daily article reported that 77.5 percent of the 
40,000 officers resettling in 2014 chose to transfer to 
civilian positions (Caixin, April 27, 2013; Beijing 
Daily, September 4, 2015). With officers making up 
at least half of the 300,000-man reduction, at least 
150,000 officers will leave the PLA in the 24-month 
period from January 2016 to December 2017 (China 
Youth Daily, June 13). Assuming that percentage 
holds and none of the 150,000 downsized officers 
choose full retirement, local governments could ex-
pect 116,350 downsized officers to transfer to civil-
ian government or SOE jobs, or about 58,125 officers 
per year. [3] These figures are roughly consistent 
with a recent government announcement that the 
58,000 PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP) offic-
ers would be resettled in 2016 (PLA Daily, Septem-
ber 1). These are daunting figures for local govern-
ments, but not necessarily unworkable ones.  
 
The above calculations do not fully capture the scale 
and logistical difficulty of downsizing and resettle-
ment. The statistics above represent the reduction in 
billets required for the PLA to reach its desired end 
strength of 2 million. The PLA will likely reduce by 
more than 300,000 personnel to account for new en-
listed and officer intake, further straining the PLA 
bureaucracy charged with reviewing civilian transfer 
applications and coordinating resettlement. The re-
settlement burden could increase substantially should 
the PLA reduce more than the stated 150,000 offic-
ers. The figures above do not account for the approx-
imately 150,000 downsized enlisted personnel; reset-
tlement statistics for eligible senior NCOs are scarce, 
and without more detailed information, the scale of 
the NCO resettlement problem remains extremely 
difficult to estimate. 
 
On the whole, finding civilian government and SOE 
jobs for the numbers of downsized officers and sen-
ior NCOs will present a significant but likely man-
ageable challenge for Chinese authorities. This will 
prove more difficult in localities already undergoing 
economic distress, and resettling NCOs could am-
plify these difficulties, although the lack of resettle-
ment statistics for NCOs makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions on the severity of the problem. The in-
formation available on officer resettlement shows 
that the amount of officers that must be given civilian 
government jobs does not appear to be dramatically 
higher than the historical figures from recent years, 
suggesting that resettlement capacity will be strained 
but not overwhelmed over the course of the downsiz-
ing. 
 
What Might Troop Reduction Cost? 
 
The same laws that govern PLA personnel discharge 
options also specify one-time separation allowances 
and on-going full or partial pensions for retirees, of-
ficers and NCOs who undertake to find their own 
jobs outside the military, and personnel disabled as a 
result of their service. The Ministry of Civil Affairs 
is responsible for providing local governments the re-
sources to make these payments. During the March 
2016 National People’s Congress, the government 
pledged to spend nearly 40 billion RMB ($6 billion) 
on personnel discharge expenses, including voca-
tional education subsidies for enlisted men and reset-
tling disabled enlisted men and retiring military per-
sonnel, representing a 12.7 percent increase over last 
year (PLA Daily, March 9). Some commentators 
have argued that the announced expenditure is insuf-
ficient—Retired PLA General and military commen-
tator Wang Hongguang (王洪光) estimated that a 
sum of at least 60 billion RMB ($9 billion USD) 
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would be required for downsized officers alone, even 
if most of the officers elected to participate in inde-
pendent job selection (Global Times, March 7). 
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the 
troop reduction will incur a hefty bill, and that Bei-
jing may not have allocated sufficient funds to the ef-
fort. 
 
The individual-level costs of downsizing are poten-
tially enormous. The PLA and the central govern-
ment must account for the costs of both pension pay-
ments and one-time buyouts, all based on rank, duty-
grade, and time in service of the downsized person-
nel. One-time buyouts alone could amount to hun-
dreds of thousands of RMB per soldier per year. 
Though current official information on the exact pay 
of PLA officers is scarce, one Global Times article 
reported that an Army second lieutenant [少尉] (pla-
toon leader grade) is paid roughly 3,000 RMB ($450) 
a month, while a lieutenant colonel [中校] (regiment 
leader grade) is paid approximately 5,000–6,000 
RMB ($750–900) a month (Global Times, January 
19, 2015). Based on this information and the regula-
tions outlined in Part 1 of this article, one-time pay-
ments alone could range from 11,750 RMB ($1,760) 
for a conscript to over 216,000 RMB ($32,335) for 
an officer participating in independent job-search. 
These payments could be larger if more high-level 
NCOs and officers are downsized, possibly reaching 
56,000 RMB ($8,340) per NCO and 440,000 RMB 
($65,900) and up for lieutenant colonels and higher. 
Factoring in 80 percent, partial pensions for inde-
pendent job-seekers and full pensions for retiring of-
ficers would further drive up the costs of the force 
reduction.  
 
The aggregate costs of downsizing can accumulate 
rapidly. If 150,000 officers are downsized, with 77.5 
percent choosing civilian transfer, and no retire-
ments—Chinese authorities would have to resettle 
some 116,250 officers into civilian positions and 
dole out one-time job-search payments for 33,750 
others. The one-time payments alone for such a 
downsizing would amount to nearly 9 billion RMB 
($1.35 billion) at a minimum, and would increase to 
some 40 billion RMB ($6 billion) if only higher-level 
officers were downsized. [4] These rough calcula-
tions do not include payments for downsized NCOs 
and conscripts, partial pensions for eligible officers, 
pensions for retiring officers, compensation for disa-
bled personnel, or the sundry benefits discharged 
PLA personnel are entitled to—all factors that will 
significantly inflate the total cost of the troop reduc-
tion.  
 
Neither the low nor the high estimates represent real-
istic troop reduction scenarios, but they put the 
budget figures cited by the Chinese government and 
Wang Hongguang into context. The 40 billion RMB 
($6 billion) expenditure announced by the Chinese 
government appears to impose some constraining fi-
nancial parameters on PLA and civilian planners. 
Several factors could inflate the cost of the downsiz-
ing beyond the relatively conservative estimates ex-
plored here. Demobilizing more than 150,000 offic-
ers or a disproportionate number of higher-ranking 
officers could further raise costs. The number of dis-
abled and retiring veterans included in the downsiz-
ing will likely increase costs both in the immediate 
and in the near future. The rough tabulations and con-
siderations discussed here indicate that the govern-
ment’s apparent largesse in veteran spending is not 
as generous as it initially appears.  
 
Will the Troop Reduction Cause Social  
Instability? 
 
The potential for the downsizing to create social in-
stability is probably the single weightiest concern for 
the Chinese government. [5] Authorities have some 
reason for wariness: veterans complain that state-
owned companies often renege on promised benefits 
and local officials embezzle funds meant for veter-
ans. Lack of official response has even prompted a 
number of prominent public protests over the last 
year. In October, more than 1,000 veterans gathered 
outside the Ministry of Defense to call for the full 
payment of benefits. In July, 4,000 veterans assem-
bled at the offices of the Central Military Commis-
sion (CMC) for the same reasons (The Wall Street 
Journal, April 26; New Tang News, July 18). [6]  
 
The troop reduction will inevitably increase tensions 
between local governments and the central govern-
ment and the PLA. Official media writings 
acknowledge these difficulties, noting that local gov-
ernments will bear the heaviest burden of finding 
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jobs for transferred officers and emphasizing the im-
portance of alleviating this pressure (China Youth 
Daily, March 3). The requirement that downsized 
personnel return to their home provinces virtually en-
sures that the troop reduction will impact Chinese 
provinces unevenly, as local governments in eco-
nomically depressed regions of China will be 
charged with finding jobs for discharged personnel. 
This could be harder if the PLA decides to cut large 
numbers of higher-ranking officers, who are entitled 
to scarce high-paying jobs. 
 
Though the potential implications for social instabil-
ity are serious, a number of factors could mitigate the 
problems of the ongoing troop reduction. Expertise 
gained from past troop reductions, general demo-
graphic characteristics of the downsizing, and the 
government’s active efforts to strengthen supervision 
of veterans’ affairs may help attenuate the difficulties 
of the current troop reduction effort.  
  
First, the PLA and the Chinese government have ex-
tensive experience managing troop downsizing, with 
at least 11 large force reductions since 1949. Past re-
ductions have been much larger and were accom-
plished in part by transferring personnel to the Peo-
ple’s Armed Police (PLA Daily, November 18, 2015; 
China Brief, March 24). Recent downsizing efforts 
were similar in size, scale, and method to the current 
downsizing. For instance, the 1997 troop reduction 
cut 500,000 troops over three years, and the most re-
cent troop reduction in 2003 downsized 200,000 
troops over two years (PLA Daily, November 18, 
2015). Though historical experience is no guarantee 
that Chinese authorities will successfully navigate 
the ongoing downsizing, both the PLA and the rele-
vant civil authorities have gained substantial insight 
into the possible problems associated with large 
troop reductions. 
 
The demographics of the downsizing may also be 
less problematic than it initially appears. Though dis-
satisfied veterans might pose a political risk for 
China’s leaders, they may constitute a relatively 
small percentage of downsized personnel. Officers 
transferred to civilian jobs should be mollified by a 
position with equivalent pay and benefits, while re-
tired officers can expect extensive benefits and a full 
pension. The biggest losers of the downsizing will be 
those officers that choose independent job-searching 
but subsequently have difficulty finding work on 
their own. Statistics from 2014, however, indicate 
that only 22.5 percent of the discharged officers 
choose independent job-search, amounting to an es-
timated 11,600 to 13,000 officers per year during the 
downsizing (Beijing Daily, September 4, 2015). This 
is no small figure, but authorities have already 
stepped up efforts to help these officers find employ-
ment by organizing conferences and teaching entre-
preneurship skills (PLA Daily, August 9). The gov-
ernment also announced the “Four Relaxations” [四
个放宽], loosening regulations on resettlement loca-
tion, time in service for civilian transfer and inde-
pendent job-search, and hardship posting eligibility 
in order to ease the burden of resettlement (PLA 
Daily, September 1). 
 
The transfer of PLA personnel to state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) may also prove less painful than spec-
ulated. Statistics from past years suggest that only 1.5 
to 2 percent of eligible officers are placed into SOEs, 
totaling 1,162 officers per year for the current troop 
reduction. Past economic reforms split SOEs into 
public and commercial categories, with several “stra-
tegic” industries kept under strict government control 
that will face a strong mandate to find jobs for dis-
charged PLA personnel (Beijing Daily, September 4, 
2015; Ministry of Finance, December 30, 2015). 
Though the percentage of enlisted personnel trans-
ferred to SOEs is unknown, the government has re-
portedly made accommodation for enlisted person-
nel, announcing that 5 percent of jobs at SOEs would 
be reserved for downsized soldiers (Reference News, 
December 30, 2015).  
 
On a broader level, the central government and the 
PLA have undertaken several steps meant to 
strengthen supervision of veterans’ affairs and elim-
inate corruption in the system. An October 2015 re-
port indicated the PLA is considering establishing an 
independent body responsible for veterans’ affairs 
(China Daily, October 9, 2015). The PLA’s recent 
organizational reforms dismantled the four general 
departments that previously handled veterans’ affairs 
for themselves, and placed the newly formed Organ 
Affairs General Management Bureau [中央军委机
关事务管理总局] in charge of veterans’ affairs un-
der direct CMC supervision (PLA Daily, April 20). 
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[7] Changes in military discharge policy covered in 
Part 1 of this article have expanded and codified ben-
efits for discharged personnel, and current policy al-
lows the central government to simply assign officers 
to jobs outside their home province if necessary 
(News of the Chinese Communist Party, January 19, 
2001). Pronouncements from the highest levels of 
China’s leadership warn against contravention of dis-
charge and resettlement policy (People’s Daily, De-
cember 28, 2015; Beijing Daily, July 15). Xi’s ongo-
ing anti-corruption campaign continues to apprehend 
corrupt officials, and may have a deterrent effect on 




The PLA and the relevant civilian agencies are aware 
of the potential negative impact on morale and social 
stability and have worked hard to anticipate and ame-
liorate problems from past force reductions. Expand-
ing and increasing benefits to demobilized con-
scripts, providing more exit opportunities to NCOs in 
the form of education stipends, and clarifying the ci-
vilian transfer process for officers all represent cal-
culated efforts by the Chinese government to soften 
the negative impact of force reductions on discharged 
personnel. These efforts are being put to the test by 
the latest round of troop downsizing.  
 
The availability of better (or even basic) statistics 
would enable PLA and China watchers to study the 
effects of personnel reduction with much greater fi-
delity. Information on PLA officer pay scales, up-
dated numbers of conscripts, NCOs, and officers in 
the force, percentage of officers that retire, records of 
resettlement of officers by province, and numbers of 
positions available for civilian transfer would shed 
more light on a topic Beijing has intentionally said 
little about. Further research on military housing pol-
icy and hukou regulations for downsized personnel 
would illuminate the geographic contours of the re-
settlement problem in better detail. 
 
Nonetheless, an examination of Chinese discharge 
and resettlement processes yields important insights 
into the prospects for a successful PLA force reduc-
tion. Tensions will be most aggravated in the locali-
ties hit hardest by the economic downturn that face 
underfunded mandates to find jobs for discharged 
PLA personnel. Challenges such as increased costs 
are serious but solvable: the government would likely 
find the monetary resources needed to make military 
discharge and pension payments if serious threats to 
social stability emerge. Furthermore, recent veteran 
protests appear to be aimed at eliciting central gov-
ernment pressure to rectify local injustices and pro-
tect veterans’ rights, rather than directing dissatisfac-
tion at the Communist Party and the central govern-
ment (New Tang News, July 18). Even if social in-
stability rises to a level that requires suppression, the 
Chinese internal security apparatus has amply 
demonstrated its ability to stifle any substantial dis-
ruption of social stability. The Party’s ability to con-
trol, co-opt, coerce, or otherwise suppress dissent is 
well-documented by past incidents and verified by 
the Party’s continued rule.  
 
The biggest challenge will be finding civilian posi-
tions for discharged personnel in poorer parts of 
China. Failure on this front could exacerbate tensions 
between the PLA and local governments, and more 
importantly, between the PLA and a Communist 
Party obliged to care for its military. For the moment, 
this challenge does not seem to be a severe threat to 
Party rule. The above analysis suggests that the PLA 
and the Chinese government are well-positioned to 
mitigate the difficulties that might arise from the 
force reduction, in spite of a slowing economic 
growth rate and increased competition for private-
sector jobs. 
 
John Chen is a research intern at the National De-
fense University. The author would like to thank Dr. 
Phillip C. Saunders, Dr. Joel Wuthnow, David C. Lo-
gan, Dennis J. Blasko, and Ken Allen for their inval-
uable insights and generous assistance. The views 
expressed in this article are the author’s alone and 
do not represent the official policy or position of the 
National Defense University, the Department of De-
fense, or the U.S. government. 
 
Notes 
1. See Figure 2 in Part 1 of this series for an 
overview of military discharge and reset-
tlement policies. 
2. The responsibility of finding jobs for re-
turning veterans falls to local People’s 
Armed Forces Departments [人民武装
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部 ], amongst other local government 
agencies. See: Ministry of National De-
fense of the People’s Republic of China, 
“2006 National Defense White Paper,” 
Xinhua, December 2006. 
http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2011-
01/06/content_4249948_2.htm  
3. This is almost certainly not a realistic as-
sumption. In the absence of reliable data 
describing the percentage of retiring of-
ficers nationwide, however, assuming no 
officer retirements helps illustrate a 
worst-case scenario for local govern-
ments charged with finding positions for 
officers. 
4. The bare minimum estimate assumes only 
second lieutenants are transferred and 
captains choose independent job-search-
ing, and the higher estimate assumes only 
colonels are downsized. These are not re-
alistic assumptions, but they help scope 
the financial burden the troop reduction 
will impose. 
5. Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, “Demobiliza-
tion and Resettlement: The Challenge of 
Downsizing the People’s Liberation 
Army,” in Civil-Military Relations in To-
day’s China, eds. David M. Finkelstein 
and Kristen Gunness (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2007), p. 257. 
6. These protests are, unsurprisingly, not 
covered by official state media. 
7. Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “The 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Gen-
eral Staff Department: Evolving Organi-
zations and Missions,” in Kevin Pollpeter 
and Kenneth W. Allen, The PLA as Or-








China’s Influence in 
Uzbekistan: Model Neighbor 
or Indifferent Partner?  
 
By Julie Yu-Wen Chen and Olaf Günther 
In offering his condolences on the death of Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov in Setepmber, Chinese 
president Xi Jinping expressed that the Chinese 
people had lost a true friend. Earlier, in late June Xi 
had delivered a speech in Uzbekistan’s parliament in 
which he called for both countries to work together 
to create the “new glory for the Silk Road” (Xinhua, 
June 21). To promote this idea, and in fulfillment of 
his promise to the Uzbektanis to revive the Silk Road 
as part of China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
initiative, Xi and Karimov opened a new electrified 
railroad connecting the Ferghana Valley with the 
Uzbekistan capital, Tashkent. The Chinese-built 
railroad was a major development in China-Uzbek 
relations.  
 
This railroad and the overall improvement in 
relations are the result of years of effort Xi and his 
predecessor, Hu Jintao. According to the the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce, bilateral trade and economic 
relationship has developed well and China is now 
Uzbekistan’s second-largest trade partner and the 
largest single investor (MOFCOM, June 20). The 
contractual value of projects started by China in 
Uzbekistan reached $6.83 million this year, with an 
accumulative turnover of $4.75 billion.  
 
At the individual level, however, Uzbeks do not 
appear to have been effected much by this investment 
and high-level meetings. Statistics from internet 
search engines such as Googles Trends and Yandex, 
Uzbekistanis’ interest in China on the Internet has not 
changed much since 2013. Apart from the major 
economic centers of Tashkent and Samarkand, the 
search word “China/китай” plays a minor role in 
public communications. This supports the idea that 
Xi was right to stress the importance of creating new 
cooperative models when he spoke to 
parliamentarians in Uzbekistan. Sino-Uzbek 
relations have certainly improved compared to two 
decades ago when Uzbekistan first established 
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diplomatic relations with China upon attaining 
independence. At that time, their economic relations 
were limited to a small-scale exchange of goods. 
China was viewed by many observers as an 
underdeveloped country warranting little attention. 
Furthermore, the fact that Uzbekistan and China do 
not share a border made trade between the two 
countries costly due to transit costs. Instead, attention 
was focused on South Korea, which was the first to 
invest in Uzbekistan on a large scale with its Daewoo 
car industry.  
 
Now, two decades after Uzbekistan’s independence, 
bilateral economic ties between the two countries 
have slowly improved from informal trade to 
technological cooperation and major investment 
activities. For instance, Huawei, the major Chinese 
telecommunication company is now Uzbekistan’s 
largest telecom provider. The signing of a strategic 
partnership between Beijing and Tashkent in 2012 
played a vital role in deepening the ties.  
 
As members of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), both China and Uzbekistan 
have used this platform for security and economic 
cooperation. In terms of security, Uzbekistan as a 
traditional transit country holds strategic transit 
corridors from East to West similar to Afghanistan. 
Despite not sharing a border with China, Uzbekistan 
is an important security partner for China in order to 
maintain inner stability of Central Asia and cooperate 
in the fight against Islamic fundamentalism. 
 
Although political, security and economic 
cooperation has been fostered at the level of high 
politics and mainstream media in Uzbekistan 
portraying China in a positive way, it was unclear 
what how local Uzbekistanis perceive China after 25 
years of independence. [1] Uzbekistan’s closed 
political environment poses significant challenges 
when conducting widespread surveys on this issue. 
With the assistance of a local scholar in a high 
academic position in the country, we conducted a 
survey based on a non-random sampling of 
Uzbekistanis in the first half of 2016. 
 
In total, we collected data from 255 students at a 
number of universities in Nukus, a large city in 
Western Uzbekistan. [2] One can consider the sample 
as a group of future elites who are educated and can 
be more internationalized than the rest of the society. 
Studying the views of future elites in an authoritarian 
regime such as Uzbekistan is meaningful because 
future elites are more likely than normal citizens to 
have come from elite families and/or with elite ties to 
affect policy changes. They are also more likely to be 
the kind of people who can make influence on 
Uzbekistan’s future development. 
 
As the data set is small and based on non-random 
sampling, one cannot claim that the results represent 
the views of the entire or the majority of 
Uzbekistan’s population. Despite its limitations the 
data provides a rare snapshot of Uzbek’s views of 
China.  
 
Perception of Economic Exchanges 
 
When asked whether they have heard of OBOR, 80.4 
percent of respondents said no. If those who said that 
they are not sure are included, the result rises to 92.9 
percent. Most Uzbeks have simply never heard of 
OBOR. The fact that OBOR is not widely reported in 
Uzbekistan’s media and that not all of our 
respondents daily follow news from other countries 
explains why OBOR is not on the locals’ radar. A 
search of Centrasia.ru, the major hub for newspapers 
in Central Asia reveals that only a few articles from 
the region refer to OBOR. Media coverage of China 
in Uzbekistan is only half of the coverage China 
receives in Kyrgyzstan. However, other surveys 
conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, show a 
similar lack of awareness of OBOR. Despite 
Beijing’s efforts in advocating OBOR in Central 
Asia and beyond, it has not been able to make its 
work known at the local and civilian level. TOBOR 
is largely engaged only at the level of high politics in 
Central Asia, led by a limited number of elites who 
have more clear interests in benefiting from 
cooperating with Beijing.  
 
Despite our respondents’ ignorance of OBOR, they 
are not entirely unaware of China’s influence. After 
all, decades of dominance of Chinese goods such as 
textiles, shoes and technical products in their local 
bazaars have secured a general awareness of Chinese 
economic activities in their country. When asked 
whether they had ever heard about Chinese 
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investments in Uzbekistan, every second respondent 
knew about economic interactions between China 
and Uzbekistan. For years, the focus of Sino-Uzbek 
economic ties was on small-scale trade. With the 
signing of more bilateral economic agreements since 
2002, investments have risen, albeit on a small scale, 
in areas such as machinery, oil and basic 
infrastructure building.  
 
Perception of China’s International Influence 
 
The legacy of the Soviet-Union and Central Asia as 
a part of Russia’s area of influence is strong, though 
attitudes are changing. When asked which country 
has the biggest influence in Asia most respondents 
considered Russia (34.9 percent) and China (29 
percent) to have the biggest influence. Russia slightly 
outnumbered China in this regard. However, most 
respondents believed that the situation will reverse in 
ten years, with 36.1 percent of respondents choosing 
China and 20 percent choosing Russia. Given the 
Soviet legacy in Uzbekistan, Russia’s high ranking 
by respondents to the first question is expected. But 
the role China plays and is expected to play in the 
eyes of the respondents is higher. Some two decades 
ago, expectations for Japan and South Korea would 
have dropped China down at least to the fourth place. 
Now China already ranks second, and respondents 
displayed an awareness that China’s influence would 
rise in the future.  
 
China’s political and economic system are often seen 
as presenting an alternative to Western-style 
democracies. When asked which country should be a 
model for Uzbekistan’s future development, 
respondents offer a different picture. In fact, an 
overwhelming majority of respondents (46.7 
percent) think that Uzbekistan should just follow its 
own model for future development. This could be 
interpreted as either a result of nationalist sentiment, 
which is common among newly independent states 
of Central Asia, or the respondents’ practical 
awareness that no other country’s model can be 
easily applied to Uzbekistan. Karimov publicly 
expressed on several occasions the notion of an 
Uzbekistan model, which emphasized a gradual path 
of development and avoided the negative effects of 
market economy reform. His remarks could have 
made an impact on the beliefs of the respondents. It 
is worth noting that the Russian model was supported 
by only 11 percent of respondents, far behind the 
answer “my country should follow its own model.” 
After the Russian model, the Japanese model 
garnered 8.2 percent and the Chinese model got 7.5 
percent of support. Although respondents understand 
China’s rising influence in Asia, respondents do not 
seem to believe that the Chinese model can help 
Uzbekistan’s development.  
 
Perception of China’s Cultural Influence 
 
In terms of cultural exchanges, Uzbekistan has had a 
long history of interaction with China. China’s 
Table 1: Country with the Biggest Perceived Influence in 
Asia 
Country Now  In 10 Years  
Japan 11 (4.3 %) 17 (6.7 %) 
China 74 (29 %) 92 (36.1 %) 
India  0 (0 %) 4 (1.6 %) 
Russia 89 (34.9 %) 51 (20 %) 
U.S. 24 (9.4 %) 27 (10.6 %) 
South Korea 7 (2.7 %) 13 (5.1 %) 
Turkey 13 (5.1 %) 4 (1.6 %) 
Saudi Arabia  4 (1.6 %) 5 (2 %) 
Other  0 (0 %) 6 (2.4 %) 
No/unclear answer 33 (12.9 %) 36 (14.1 %) 
Total 255 255 
Table 2: Which Country Should Be a Model for Your 
Country’s Future Development?  
Country Numbers of 
Respondents 
Japan 21 (8.2 %) 
China 19 (7.5 %) 
India 0  
Russia 28 (11 %) 
U.S. 7 (2.7 %) 
Singapore 2 (0.8 %) 
Malaysia 1 (0.4 %) 
South Korea 10 (3.9 %) 
Turkey 11 (4.3 %) 
Saudi Arabia  0 
My country should follow its own 
model 
119 (46.7 %) 
Other 3 (1.2 %) 
No answers 34 (13.3 %) 
Total 255 
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softpower has left a long trail of footprints in Persian 
and Turkic parts of Central Asia.  
 
In the 20th century, the capital of Uzbekistan, 
Tashkent, served throughout Soviet times as the 
center for Chinese studies. Beginning in 1957, people 
from all over Central Asia came to Tashkent to learn 
Mandarin. After becoming indedpendent in 1991 
Uzbekistan has received support from the Chinese 
government to continue Mandarin education. The 
Confucius Institute in Tashkent is not only the first 
Confucius Institute in Uzbekistan, but also the first in 
Central Asia. Opened in 2005, it has functioned like 
other Confucius Institutes around the world with the 
mission to promote Mandarin teaching as well as 
cultural and educational exchanges between the two 
countries.  
 
The survey and interviews revealed a second image 
of China beyond being an economic and political 
power. When asked where people can go to learn 
Chinese in Uzbekistan, almost every second student 
(45.5 percent) knows where to learn Chinese. This 
result explains the outward directed intention of 
many students in Uzbekistan. Studying in Uzbekistan 
often means finding a way to get jobs in more 
developed countries, such as Arab countries, 
European countries or the United States. Studying the 
Chinese language in the 1990s was seen as an exotic 
discipline. [3] Now Chinese is viewed as 
economically rational to study and many students 




Local Uzbekistanis’ perception of China varies 
depending on the issue. Respondents seem to have 
some impression of China’s increasing cultural, 
economic and political influences. However, they do 
not necessarily know details of projects, such as the 
OBOR, nor do they believe that the Chinese model 
of development can be easily adopted for 
Uzbekistan’s own development. The recent death of 
President Karimov and uncertainty around the future 
leadership of Uzbekistan might shift the direction of 
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. To what extent this 
change will affect Sino-Uzbek relations at the level 
of high politics as well as Chinese investments in 
Uzbekistan has yet to be seen. At the civilian level, 
as our survey indicates, existing local perceptions of 
China will be stable and will not experience major 
change even if there is a shift of Sino-Uzbek relations 
in higher political and economic levels.  
 
Yu-Wen Chen is Professor of Chinese Studies at the 
University of Helsinki in Finland, Hosting Professor 
of Asian Studies at Palacký University in Czech 
Republic and non-resident senior fellow at the China 
Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham in the 
United Kingdom. Olaf Günther is senior researcher 
at Palacký University in Czech Republic. 
 
Notes: 
1. Xi Jiao, “Critical Discourse Analysis of 
China’s Images in Mainstream Central Asian 
Online Media: The Example of Uzbekistan,” 
(批评性话语分析视阈下中亚主流网络媒
体中的”中国形象”研究——以乌兹别克斯
坦为例), Science & Technology Vision, No. 
23, 2015, pp. 109–110.  
2. We began with 257 observations all 
university students aged 20–30 at the city 
branch of Tashkent Pediatric Medical 
Institute, Karakalpak State University, the 
Nukus branch of Tashkent State Agrarian 
University, and the Nukus branch of the 
Uzbek State Institute of Arts and Culture. 
Two were excluded due to the respondents 
being from Turkmenistan.  
3. Telephone interview with a teacher on 
Chinese language at the Oriental Institute of 




The Cultural Revolution at 50  
By Yevgen Sautin 
 
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the official 
start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
(GPCR). Though for many of China’s youth it is a 
little-remembered period or a vaguely described part 
of history books, the political turmoil of the time has 
continued to have a profound influence on modern 
society. An examination of Chinese treatment of the 
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period provides useful insights into the current polit-
ical climate.  
 
Although by no means exhaustive, this analysis illus-
trates several distinct trends in China’s modern inter-
pretation of the Cultural Revolution. Most visibly, 
there is a clear desire by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) to look past the Cultural Revolution and 
limit coverage of the period since it harms the Party’s 
overall image. A second notable trend is the general 
lack of interest in the period among younger Chinese 
scholars. The last theme, ironically, is the continued 
salience of the legacy of political violence in contem-
porary Chinese discourse and the use of the Cultural 
Revolution in various contemporary information 
campaigns.  
 
Changes in the Official Narrative 
 
In May of this year, both the People’s Daily and the 
Party’s theoretical journal, Qiu Shi (Seeking Truth/求
是), ran official statements on the Cultural Revolu-
tion (Seeking Truth, May 17). The language was 
terse and reiterated that the ten-year period was a 
mistake and that similar errors will not be tolerated 
again. The articles followed a familiar formula and 
called for history to be used as a reference to improve 
the pace of current national development. Common 
to almost every article on the issue were references 
to the watershed 1981 “Resolution on Certain Histor-
ical Issues” (历史问题决议) which unequivocally 
repudiated the Cultural Revolution and criticized 
Mao Zedong for various excesses, paving the way for 
a significant scale down of his cult of personality. 
Noticeably absent, however, was commentary on the 
legacy of the Cultural Revolution and its long-term 
effects on Chinese society and political thought. This 
has not always been the case.  
 
In contrast with the official comments made this 
year, the 1981 Resolution left no doubt about how 
Deng Xiaoping and the second generation of Chinese 
political leaders viewed the Cultural Revolution’s 
place in China’s history: 
 
  (19) From 1966 to 1976, the Cultural 
Revolution caused the Party, the 
country, and the people to endure the 
most serious setback and loss since 
the [founding of the PRC]. The Cul-
tural Revolution was launched and 
led by [Mao Zedong]… (20) The his-
tory of the Cultural Revolution 
demonstrates that the main tenets of 
the Cultural Revolution, which were 
put forth by [Mao Zedong], are in-
compatible with Marxism-Leninism 
and China’s reality. [Those tenets’] 
appraisal of China’s class conditions, 
as well as Party and state political 
conditions at the time was completely 
incorrect. [1] 
 
The 1981 conference convened at a time when the 
more liberal elements of the CCP wanted to take crit-
icism even further and directly denounce Mao 
Zedong. In the immediate years prior to the confer-
ence, several prominent victims of the Cultural Rev-
olution and the Great Leap Forward such as Liu 
Shaoqi and Peng Dehuai were rehabilitated while 
some of the perpetrators were put on trial. The final 
position adopted then, represented a compromise, 
and should not be seen as outside the norm of what 
the Party would normally tolerate. Although some of 
China’s most ardent critics at the time said the reso-
lution did not go far enough, the conference generally 
succeeded in its initial objective to admit, study, and 
correct mistakes of the past. Thirty years later, 
China’s official position on the Cultural Revolution, 
while still critical, does not begin to approach the pre-
vious levels of criticism and reflection, particularly 
when it comes to assigning blame for its origins.  
 
Growing disinclination to address in depth sensitive 
topics in China’s history can also be seen in the cov-
erage of this year’s 95th anniversary of the CCP’s 
founding. Despite the heavy focus on Party history 
this year, most publications glossed over or omitted 
entirely any direct mention of Mao’s culpability in 
unleashing the Cultural Revolution (Seeking Truth, 
July 21). The Xinhua special video production for the 
95th anniversary of the CCP’s founding, “Red 
Spirit,” made no mention of the Cultural Revolution 
or the Great Leap Forward, only stating that the Party 
had gone through “great difficulties” on its road to-
ward building socialism in China (Xinhua, June 20). 
Even when the editorial line admits to mistakes such 
ChinaBrief                                                    November 11, 2016 
 16 
as the Cultural Revolution and reiterates calls for us-
ing history as a mirror, no discussion is made of the 
mistakes’ origin or how to guard against their reoc-
currence (Xinhua, August 12).  
  
Although Party history is once again covered in al-
most exclusively positive language, the Cultural 
Revolution itself is paradoxically not taboo for Chi-
nese official outlets. In fact, the period is sometimes 
evoked in rather unexpected places. A Qiu Shi article 
criticizing “Western universal values” argued that 
the experiences of the Cultural Revolution show 
China the dangers of dogmatism and following theo-
ries not grounded in China’s reality (Seeking Truth, 
August 5). While at first glance it may seem strange 
that the Cultural Revolution is conjured up in an ar-
gument extolling China’s own development model, 
the reference suggests that Chinese authorities are 
keenly aware of just how visceral any associations 
with the period are for most Chinese citizens. By put-
ting the Cultural Revolution with its discredited uni-
versal applicability side by side with “Western uni-
versal values” China’s state outlets are hoping the do-
mestic Chinese audience will associate the chaotic 
process of democratization with the chaos endured 
from 1966–76.  
 
The Cultural Revolution and China’s Elite 
 
The narrative that Xi Jinping has taken China on a 
“left turn” is quite popular among the mainstream 
media and many China watchers. Indeed, under Xi 
Jinping’s leadership terms such as the “Dictatorship 
of the Proletariat” or “against the Party and against 
socialism” (反党反社会主义) have remerged in of-
ficial discourse for the first time since Deng Xiao-
ping’s reforms and opening of the country (China 
Media Project, December 30). Despite an increase in 
“red” rhetoric, it is unlikely that Xi Jinping or anyone 
else in senior leadership looks favorably upon the 
years of the Cultural Revolution. In 2000, while still 
a provincial official, Xi Jinping spoke candidly about 
the personal hardships endured by him and his family 
during the Cultural Revolution (People’s Daily, Sep-
tember 11). When it comes to official pronounce-
ments, Xi Jinping is far more fond of quoting Han 
Feizi (韓非子) and other Chinese classical legalist 
scholars who stressed strict abidance of the law than 
rehabilitating the political rhetoric of the Red Guards 
(People’s Daily, March 1).  
 
That does not mean however that the ghosts of the 
Cultural Revolution have been fully expunged. For 
one, Xi Jinping has been clear that he does not sup-
port efforts to revisit the pre-reform period, stating 
that: “One cannot use the subsequent thirty years to 
repudiate the preceding thirty years (不能用后三十
年否定前三十年) (BBC Chinese, May 10).” In ad-
dition, among many party elders and rank-and-file 
members, the defense of the Party’s history is much 
more than just an effort to preserve legitimacy and 
power, it is a deeply personal mission. Outside the 
Party, the period is also romanticized by some who 
lived through it. As a result, it is unsurprising that the 
disgraced former Chongqing head Bo Xilai, was able 
to build a considerable popular following by playing 
Maoist songs and using 1960s slogans.  
 
One particularly burdensome legacy of the Cultural 
Revolution, crude political discourse, while never 
entirely went away, has witnessed a clear resurgence. 
For instance, several iterations of “[We cannot] allow 
the eating of the Communist Party’s food by those 
who smash the Communist Party’s pots” (不允许吃
共产党的饭，砸共产党的锅) appeared in various 
official publications starting from late 2014 [2]. Such 
language has direct antecedents to slogans used by 
the Red Guards during struggle sessions. Chinese in-
tellectuals have noted the language of violence and 
hate directed toward political opponents as one of the 
most deleterious long-lasting effects of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 
Views among China’s Intellectuals  
 
Despite apparent pressure to curtail coverage of the 
anniversary, the Cultural Revolution has received a 
more thorough analysis in non-state media outlets 
(Duowei News, May 15). Consensus Net (共识网), a 
news and commentary portal that aggregates content 
and also features original contributions from com-
mentators and public intellectuals ran several articles 
on the Cultural Revolution coinciding with the anni-
versary. Although the publications discuss different 
aspects of the Cultural Revolution, they all demon-
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strate its continued importance to China’s contempo-
rary society and politics. A consistent theme in sev-
eral intellectual publications is the dismay at the gen-
eral lack of interest in the period among China’s 
younger scholars. This observation is indicative of a 
broader apathy to contemporary Chinese history 
among the post-1980s generation that has been noted 
elsewhere. [3]  
 
Since formal education was severely disrupted dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, an entire generation was 
largely shaped and educated by the struggles of the 
Cultural Revolution; when combined with the fact 
that the subsequent generations have only been par-
tially exposed to the history of the period, a ripe en-
vironment has been created for invented and mythol-
ogized interpretations of the period. Du Yingguo (杜
应国), a retired researcher from Guizhou’s provincial 
literature and history research center has shown how 
several myths regarding the root causes of the Cul-
tural Revolution have emerged over the years. One, 
is the mistaken belief that Mao Zedong launched the 
Cultural Revolution as an effort to fight growing bu-
reaucratism (Gong shi, May 3). This view is particu-
larly popular among Western scholars and obscures 
linkages between the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolu-
tion and earlier Anti-rightist purges of the 1950s. Ac-
cording to Du, the Cultural Revolution was the cul-
mination of an increasingly extreme hunt for “capi-
talist roaders,” “revisionists,” and other enemies in-
side and outside the Party. Du’s observation is not a 
pedantic one: it discredits today’s leftist revisionist 
narratives in China extolling the pre-Reform period 
which in the context of modern anti-corruption cam-
paigns and bureaucratic indifference are quite popu-
lar among some segments of the population. Du also 
takes issue with the characterization of the Cultural 
Revolution as a mass movement (文革大民主的形
式). Even though millions of people were swept up 
in the tidal wave of struggle, the movement was cen-
tered on cities and served political aims of Mao and 
other Cultural Revolution backers.  
 
Wuhan University’s Dr.Yu Chongsheng’s (虞崇胜) 
work addresses the continued effects of the Cultural 
Revolution most directly (Gong Shi, April 19). Dr. 
Yu sees the root of violence during the Cultural Rev-
olution in Maoist rhetoric. Class struggle, the obses-
sion in rooting out enemies (with an emphasis that 
identifying enemies precedes identifying allies) all 
predetermined that the Cultural Revolution was go-
ing to be a bloody internecine conflict. Unfortu-
nately, the language and consciousness of struggle 
has persisted in China long after the end of the Cul-
tural Revolution. And even though reforms from 
above have made significant legal and ideological 
changes such as formally abolishing the criminal 
charge of being a counterrevolutionary (反革命) in 
1997 or revising the Party position away from calling 
for class struggle, change has been slower in the peo-
ple’s consciousness. In fact, Yu Chongsheng’s argu-
ment can be taken a step further in light of the steady 
return to fore of old communist slogans from the pre-
reform era and the propensity for using crass com-
ments mentioned earlier. 
 
The liberal Chinese journal Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎
黃春秋), which recently closed after undergoing an 
editorial reshuffle at the behest of the Chinese Na-
tional Academy of Arts, has until now been willing 
to take up highly iconoclastic positions on numerous 
issues surrounding Party and state history. The jour-
nal was run by retired Party cadres and has long held 
a position of particular importance among China’s 
liberal intelligentsia. Due to its small circulation and 
Party roots, the magazine was tolerated by Chinese 
authorities. Perhaps tellingly, there are rumors that 
the recent closure was prompted by the magazine’s 
planned special issue for the Cultural Revolution’s 
anniversary (Duowei News, May 15). 
 
The magazine limited its coverage of the anniversary 
to an article by Jin Daliu (金大陆), an expert on the 
Cultural Revolution. Jin lamented the polarization of 
views on the Cultural Revolution in today’s China 
(Yanhuang Chunqiu, May 13). According to him, 
Leftists are willing to steadfastly defend the Cultural 
Revolution because they wish to preserve the legacy 
and image of PRC’s early history. On the other end 
of the spectrum, right wing sentiment calls for col-
lective punishment and contrition which is unfeasible 
and highly divisive. Both views are ultimately coun-
terproductive and make it more difficult for genuine 
reconciliation. As is the case with other Chinese in-
tellectuals, Jin is worried that the new generation of 
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Chinese scholars are uninterested in Cultural Revo-
lution. This can be explained in part by the risks of 
jeopardizing academic careers, but the result is that 
Chinese historians may actually fall behind their 
Western counterparts in the research of this crucial 
period in China’s history.  
 
In addition to running Jin Daliu’s commentary, 
Yanhuang Chunqiu also republished Zhang Wen-
tian’s (张闻天) recollections from the later stages of 
the Cultural Revolution (Yanhuang Chunqiu, April 
9). Zhang was part of the 28 Bolsheviks and filled 
several important posts in the PRC before being de-
nounced during the Cultural Revolution. [4] Under 
great personal risk, he kept a private journal through-
out the period where he criticized the social and po-
litical strife of the time. His writing, offering lucid 
analysis at a time of great unrest, explores the role of 
the separation between the Party and the masses in 
fomenting the Cultural Revolution. According to his 
observations, there was a need to renounce the use of 
violence to settle disputes. Going further, Zhang saw 
the need for real ability to criticize and supervise 
Party and state activity by the people. Moreover, con-
cern for the people’s material wellbeing in his words 
is not “taking the capitalist road” and comports with 
Leninist ideals. Throughout his diary, he emphasizes 
that the Party is the servant of the people and the peo-
ple are masters, not the other way around. Even when 
reprinted, such rhetoric coming from a personage of 
impeccable revolutionary credentials is still a direct 




In Western media and China circles, the 50th anni-
versary of the Cultural Revolution was met with 
noted interest. Most of the commentary focused on 
the question of could a similar calamity happen again 
in contemporary China. When looking at China’s dis-
course around the 50th anniversary, one finds little 
concern among either state or intellectual sources for 
a repeat of the Cultural Revolution. However, the 
Cultural Revolution continues to influence political 
rhetoric and popular understanding of state affairs. 
Despite its importance to China’s reality, one sees 
general disinterest among younger Chinese experts 
and the slow but steady effort by the state to reduce 
coverage of the Cultural Revolution. Such trends 
while not exactly portentous, ensure that the long 
shadow of the Cultural Revolution will not be lifted 
anytime soon.  
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1. Full text of the 1981 “Resolution on certain 
questions in the history of our party since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China.” 
Chinese Here. English Here. 
2. In 2014, the PLA Daily ran an article criticiz-
ing Party members who besmirch the Party 
and abuse their positions. The article used the 
bowl metaphor and was quickly picked up by 
many other outlets.  
3. See for example, Lim, Louisa. The People’s 
Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
4. A faction of Moscow-trained CCP members 
who played an important role in the Party’s 
pre-Long March history. Their defeat at the 
Zunyi conference (遵义会议) marked the as-
cent of Mao Zedong to power.  
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